The Zombie Zero malware proves that sophisticated attackers are targeting the supply chain. Is it time to think about inspecting imported hardware and software?
If you want to import beef, eggs or chicken into the U.S., you need to get your cargo past inspectors from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Not so hardware and software imported into the U.S. and sold to domestic corporations.
But a spate of stories about products shipping with malicious software raises the question: is it time for random audits to expose compromised supply chains?
Concerns about ‘certified, pre-pwned’ hardware and software are nothing new. In fact, they’ve permeated the board rooms of technology and defense firms, as well as the halls of power in Washington, D.C. for years.
The U.S. Congress conducted a high profile investigation of Chinese networking equipment maker ZTE in 2012 with the sole purpose of exploring links between the company and The People’s Liberation Army, and (unfounded) allegations that products sold by the companies were pre-loaded with spyware.
Of course, now we know that such threats are real. And we know because documents leaked by Edward Snowden and released in March showed how the U.S. National Security Agency intercepts networking equipment exported by firms like Cisco and implants spyware and remote access tools on it, before sending it on its way. Presumably, the NSA wasn’t the first state intelligence agency to figure this out.
If backdoors pre-loaded on your Cisco switches and routers aren’t scary enough, this week, the firm TrapX issued a report on a piece of malicious software they called “Zombie Zero.” TrapX claims to have found the malware installed on scanners used in shipping and logistics to track packages and other products. The scanners were manufactured in China and sold to companies globally. The factory that manufactured the devices is located close to the Lanxiang Vocational School, an academy that is believed to have played a role in sophisticated attacks on Google and other western technology firms dubbed “Aurora.” Traffic associated with a command and control botnet set up by Zombie Zero were also observed connecting to servers at the same facility – which is suggestive, but not proof of the School’s involvement in the attack.
TrapX said that its analysis found that 16 of 64 scanners sold to a shipping and logistics firm that they consulted with were infected. The Zombie Zero malware was programmed to exploit access to corporate wireless networks at the target firms to attack finance and ERP systems at the firms.
Scanners outfitted with another variant of Zombie Zero were shipped to eight other firms, including what is described as a “major robotics” manufacturer, TrapX claims.
If accurate, TrapX’s Zombie Zero is the most flagrant example of compromised hardware being used in a targeted attack. Its significant because it shows how factory loaded malware on an embedded device (in this case: embedded XP) could be used to gain a foothold on the networks of a wide range of companies in a specific vertical.
Prior “malicious supply chain” stories haven’t had that kind of specificity. Dell warned about compromised PowerEdge motherboards back in 2010, but there was no indication that the compromised motherboards were directed to particular kinds of Dell customers. Recent news about Android smartphones pre-loaded with spyware and teapots with wireless “spy chips” seemed more indicative of an undifferentiated cyber criminal operation satisfied to cast a wide net.
Not so TrapX, whose creators seemed intent both on compromising a particular type of firm (by virtue of the kind of device they used as their calling card) and extracting a particular type of data from those firm – the hallmarks of a sophisticated “APT” style actor.
There’s really no easy answer to this. Warning U.S. firms away from Chinese products is all well and good, but it’s also a strategy that won’t work, while punishing lots of innocent companies selling quality product. The truth is that any technology product you buy today is almost certain to contain components that were sourced in China. Any of those components could contain malicious software supplied by a compromised or unscrupulous down steam supplier. “Buy American” is even more pointless in the context of technology than it was back in the automobile sector back in the 70s and 80s.
What’s to be done? Security conscious firms need to take much more interest in the provenance of the hardware and software they buy. Firms, like Apple, that are big enough to have leverage might consider random audits of equipment and firmware looking for compromises. They might also insist on reviewing the manufacturing facilities where devices are assembled to see what kinds of quality controls the manufacturer has over the software and hardware that is installed in their products.
Beyond that, the U.S. government – via U.S. Customs and Border Protection (and like agencies in other nations) could take an interest in the contents and quality of IT products that are imported from China and other countries.
A system of random inspections and audits – akin to the inspections that are done for agricultural and consumer products – could raise the stakes for firms and governments intent on slipping compromised IT equipment and embedded devices into the U.S. market.