Posted by Chris Wysopal in RESEARCH, August 31, 2011 |
Let’s not mince words: this rambling diatribe from Oracle’s CSO is aimed directly at Veracode. No need for a cutesy acronym; we’re the only company with true static binary analysis technology, delivered as a service. Now that we’ve got that out of the way, let’s try to cut through the rhetoric (in just over a thousand words, to boot).
The recurring theme in her manifesto is the notion that certain software suppliers are “too big to test”. It’s fine for the little guys, but not the 800-pound gorillas. Instead, software purchasers should blindly trust companies with security …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, July 6, 2011 |
[UPDATE: Since there seems to be some confusion, the "We" in the title of this post is NOT "Veracode". The expression is a generic one intended to illustrate the attitude exhibited by many companies who like to downplay the value and/or effectiveness of technologies that they themselves do not sell. I can't believe I am having to explain this.]
Fair warning, this is a bit of a rant.
Back in my consulting days (early 2000, I’m getting old), we delighted in the fact that our web application penetration testing methodology didn’t rely on automated tools. This was completely true; …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, December 7, 2010 |
As application inventories have become larger, more diverse, and increasingly complex, organizations have struggled to build application security testing programs that are effective and scalable. New technologies and methodologies promise to help streamline the Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC), making processes more efficient and easing the burden of information overload.
In the realm of automated web application testing, today’s technologies fall into one of two categories, Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST). SAST analyzes application binaries or source code, detecting vulnerabilities by identifying insecure code paths without actually executing the program. In contrast, …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, September 27, 2010 |
Is anyone else getting tired of hearing excuses from customers — and worse yet, the security community itself — about how hard it is to fix cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities? Oh, come on. Fixing XSS is like squashing ants, but some would have you believe it’s more like slaying dragons. I haven’t felt inspired to write a blog post in a while, but every once in a while, 140 characters just isn’t enough. Grab your cup of coffee, because I may get a little rambly.
Easy to Fix vs. Easy to Eradicate
Let’s start with some terminology to …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, May 17, 2010 |
Lots of people have been asking us for opinions on HTML5 security lately. Chris and I discussed the potential attack vectors with the Veracode research team, most notably Brandon Creighton and Isaac Dawson. Here’s some of what we came up with. Keep in mind that the HTML5 spec and implementations are still evolving, particularly with respect to security concerns, so we shouldn’t assume any of this is set in stone.
Don’t Forget Origin Checks on Cross-Document Messaging
Applications that use cross-document messaging could be unsafe if origin checking is done incorrectly (or not at all) in the message …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, November 20, 2009 |
A conversation on Twitter this morning started out like this:
@dinozaizovi: Finding vulnerabilities without exploiting them is like putting on a dress when you have nowhere to go.
This clever analogy spurred a discussion about the importance of proving exploitability as a prerequisite to fixing bugs. While I agree that nothing is more convincing than a working exploit, there will always be a greater volume of bugs discovered than there are vulnerability researchers to write exploits. Don’t get me wrong — as a former penetration tester, I agree that it is fun to write exploits, it just shouldn’t be a …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, January 26, 2009 |
Monster.com recently disclosed yet another major breach that compromised the personal data of over 1.3 million users. This is not unlike the previous breach in August 2007, though the attack vector was likely different. From a notice on their website (emphasis mine):
We recently learned our database was illegally accessed and certain contact and account data were taken, including Monster user IDs and passwords, email addresses, names, phone numbers, and some basic demographic data. The information accessed does not include resumes.
Considering the well-known tendency to use the same password on multiple websites, compounded with the fact …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, January 20, 2009 |
One of the great challenges for consumers of static analysis products, particularly desktop tools, is dealing with the large flaw counts. You have to wade through the findings to decide what to fix and when, which can be a daunting task. At Veracode, we continuously update our analysis engine to aggressively reduce false positives, thereby enabling our customers to more efficiently triage their results. Even so, it’s not unusual for customers to ask for clarification on certain flaws as they prioritize fixes.
The other day, we ran into an example that ended up being much more interesting than …
Posted by Chris Eng in RESEARCH, January 7, 2009 |
If you were paying attention the last few days, you’ve probably read about the wave of attacks launched against the popular Twitter service. It started over the weekend, with a series of phishing attacks sent to unsuspecting Twittizens via Direct Message. Then, on Monday morning, Fox News announced Bill O’Riley (sic) was gay, CNN anchor Rick Sanchez tweeted that he was high on crack, and the Barack Obama transition team decided to raise a few bucks using affiliate referral links to survey websites. All told, 33 celebrity accounts were compromiwsed before Twitter caught on …
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